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Abstract 
Errors in simple choice tasks result in systematic changes in the response time and 
accuracy of subsequent trials. We propose that there are at least two different causes 
of choice errors – response speed, and evidence quality – which result in different 
types of post-error changes. We explore these differences in types of errors and post-
error changes in two recognition memory experiments with speed vs. accuracy 
emphasis conditions that differentially produce response-speed and evidence-quality 
errors. Under conditions that give rise to more response-speed errors, we find 
evidence of traditional post-error slowing. Under conditions that give rise to 
evidence-quality errors, we find evidence of post-error speeding. We propose a 
broadening of theories of cognitive control to encompass maladaptive as well as 
adaptive strategies, and discuss implications for the use of post-error changes to 
measure cognitive control.  
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Identifying, responding to, and learning from errors are vital to adaptive functioning. 
As such, errors and their consequences are widely studied as markers of cognitive control. 
Error control is typically studied in simple and rapid choice tasks through the occurrence of 
systematic changes in response time (RT) and accuracy on subsequent trials.  Within this 
literature, a lack of consensus has developed regarding post-error consequences, their causes, 
measurement, and interpretation (for review, see Williams et al., 2016).  
Here we examine a perspective on post-error effects provided by dynamic theories of 
rapid choice (for a review, see Brown & Heathcote, 2008) that assume decisions are based on 
accumulating evidence over time. A response is triggered when the summed evidence for one 
option reaches its threshold. Errors, which occur when the wrong evidence threshold is 
reached first, can be both systematically faster and slower than correct responses (Ratcliff & 
Rouder, 1998). These two categories of errors are assumed to have distinct causes, and to 
occur in all experimental conditions with their relative proportions varying systematically as 
a function of whether the speed or accuracy of responses is emphasized. 
Faster errors occur when responding is rushed. Random variation in evidence 
accumulation from moment-to-moment (Stone, 1960) and random bias in evidence 
accumulation start points from trial-to-trial (Laming, 1968) have been proposed as two causes 
of such speed errors. These random variations can lead to evidence favoring an incorrect 
response. Increasing the decision threshold reduces their effects, but at the cost of slowed 
responding. This speed-accuracy tradeoff mechanism is thought to explain post-error slowing 
by a threshold increase that reduces the probability of response-speed errors. 
Slower errors occur when accuracy is emphasized over speed. Evidence-accumulation 
models assume slower errors are due to poor evidence quality. If average evidence 
accumulation rates vary randomly from trial to trial and decisions are difficult, such 
evidence-quality errors occur on trials where the average favors the wrong response. In this 
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case, further evidence accumulation due to an increased threshold amplifies, rather than 
reduces, the tendency to make an error (Laming, 1968).  In describing this phenomenon in 
the context of post-error slowing, Laming (1979) argued that participants “run out of data” 
(pp. 219) on tasks of sufficiently high difficultly, and Rabbitt and Vyas (1970) made 
reference to errors of perceptual analysis.  
Although evidence-accumulation models acknowledge these very different categories 
of response-speed and data-quality errors, broader cognitive control research has focused 
almost exclusively on response-speed errors and post-error slowing (Williams et al., 2016). 
Cognitive control theories commonly assume that the occurrence of errors trigger post-error 
slowing to increase accuracy. However, post-error slowing is only an effective remedy for 
response-speed errors. When poor evidence quality is the dominant cause of errors, slowing 
costs time for what might be little to no benefit. 
When accuracy is emphasized, and/or tasks are difficult, RT is typically longer. When 
decision making evidence can not be improved due to data, cognitive, and/or perceptual 
limitations, some errors are unavoidable and spending longer making choices wastes time. If 
decision makers value both speed and accuracy (i.e., they are optimizing reward rate; Bogacz 
et al., 2006), and additional time is not improving accuracy, it may be more adaptive to lower 
the decision threshold and choose more quickly, leading to post-error speeding. 
We propose these two causes of error; (1) response speed, and (2) evidence quality 
are systematically associated with two distinct post-error changes; (1) post-error slowing, and 
(2) post-error speeding, respectively. This proposal leads to three predictions. Firstly, when 
experimental manipulations give rise to more response-speed errors, we should find post-
error slowing. Secondly, when experimental manipulations give rise to more evidence-quality 
errors, we should find no post-error slowing, and perhaps post-error speeding. Finally, 
because dynamic choice theories assume response-speed and evidence-quality errors are 
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present in all manipulations to some extent, and we expect response-speed errors to be faster 
than evidence-quality errors, post-error changes may vary systemically within a condition. 
Specifically, errors made in the faster half of the RT distribution may show more post-error 
slowing, while errors made in the slower half of the RT distribution may show less post-error 
slowing (or post-error speeding).  
To test our proposition, we reanalyzed two published data sets (Osth et al., 2017; Rae 
et al., 2014). Both were recognition memory experiments where participants were instructed 
to respond either quickly or accurately across blocks. Emphasizing speed should lead to a 
greater proportion of response-speed errors and post-error slowing. Emphasizing accuracy 
should lead to a greater proportion of evidence quality errors and post-error speeding.  
 
Methods 
The methods are reported in Rae et al. (2014), and Osth et al., (2017). Note Osth et al. 
(2017) is an extension of Rae et al., (2014) where participants additionally indicated their 
confidence in the correctness of the response they had just made.  
Measuring Post-Error Change 
The standard method of quantifying post-error slowing involves subtracting the mean 
RT of each participant’s post-error trials from the mean RT of their post-correct trials. This 
type of global averaging can be confounded by slow fluctuations in speed and accuracy (e.g., 
more error occurring during periods of slower responding), and differences in the speed of 
error and correct responses (e.g., slowing after faster responses when errors are faster). Two 
alternative calculations have been proposed to address these confounds, respectively, the 
robust method (Dutilh et al., 2012) and the matched method (Hajcak & Simons, 2002). We 
employ all three methods, with details on how we did so provided in supplementary 
materials. In order to examine the prediction of cognitive control theories that post-error 
DIFFERENT ERRORS AND POST-ERROR CHANGES 6 
 
slowing is associated with increased accuracy we report the results of applying all three 
methods to response accuracy.  
 
Results 
For Rae et al., (2014), one participant was excluded due to recording error, leaving 47 
data sets for analysis. For Osth et al., (2017) an additional 10 participants were collected post 
publication for the purpose of increasing sample size to support further analysis, making 46 
participants in total. For both experiments, sequential pairs or triplets including responses 
faster than 150ms or slower than 2500ms were removed from analyses. All results were 
calculated for each participant before assessing averages over participants in each experiment 
and condition. 
The supplementary materials contain analyses confirming that, in line with 
expectations and in both experiments, errors were faster and more frequent in the speed-
emphasis conditions, and less frequent and slower in the accuracy-emphasis conditions.  
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Figure 1. Post-error RT changes under speed and accuracy emphasis for the robust, matched, 
and standard calculation methods. The top row of plots represents data for Rae et al., (2014). 
The bottom row of plots represents data from Osth et al., (2017). Positive results indicate 
post-error slowing. ‘s’ and ‘a’ indicate speed and accuracy; ‘*’ indicates a two-tailed t-test of 
the difference from zero was significant at p = .05. Error bars indicate the standard error of 
the mean.  
 
The plots in Figure 1 establish that, for both experiments, post-error slowing occurred 
under speed emphasis and post-error speeding occurred under accuracy emphasis. For Rae et 
al., (2014), paired sample t-tests confirm the consistency of these differences in post-error 
slowing between speed and accuracy conditions across the robust (speed mean, Ms = 19.15, 
accuracy mean, Ma = -19.05, t[46] = 3.26, p = .002), matched (Ms = 19.29, Ma =  38.64, 
t[46] = 5.21, p < .001), and standard (Ms = 17.28, Ma = -15.05, t[46] = 3.15, p = .003) 
methods. For Osth et al., (2017) similar t-tests found reliable changes between conditions for 
the matched (Ms = 13.86, Ma = -34.85, t[45] = 3.34, p = .002) and standard methods (Ms = 
6.34, Ma = -37.59, t[45] = 2.98, p = .005), but not the robust method, although the latter is in 
the expected direction. These results support our hypotheses that the two types of error are 
associated with differing post-error adjustments.  
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Figure 2. Post-error RT changes using the robust, matched, and standard calculation methods 
for speed and accuracy emphasis and error position (earlier/later). Participants who had less 
than 5 suitable errors in a bin were removed entirely from analyses. Error bars represent the 
within-subjects standard error of the mean (Morey, 2008). 
 
We hypothesized that there would be more response-speed errors in faster RT bins 
and more evidence-quality errors in slower RT bins, and so predicted more post-error 
slowing for errors made in the fastest 50% of responses (hereafter, earlier errors), and more 
post-error speeding for errors made in the slowest 50% of responses (hereafter, later errors). 
Figure 2 confirms these predictions for both conditions and experiments and for all 
calculation methods, although to a lesser degree for the standard method. Inferential analyses 
support these visual interpretations. We performed two-way within-subjects ANOVAs for 
each calculation method, using condition (speed/accuracy) and error placement (earlier/later) 
as factors. The main effect of error placement was significant for Rae et al. (2014) for the 
robust (p = .032) and matched (p = .035) methods, but not the standard (p = .199) method. 
DIFFERENT ERRORS AND POST-ERROR CHANGES 9 
 
This pattern was replicated for Osth et al., (2017), where the robust (p = .007) and matched (p 
= .029) methods again reached significance, but not the standard (p = .096) method. Full 
ANOVA results are reported in the supplementary materials.   
 
Discussion 
In line with our hypotheses, in the two recognition memory experiments we analysed, 
Rae et al. (2017) and Osth et al. (2017), we found post-error slowing when response-speed 
errors dominated, and post-error speeding when evidence-quality errors dominated. In order 
to control for potential confounds in the standard measurement method we also used the 
robust (Dutilh et al., 2012) and matched (Hajcak & Simons, 2002) methods of calculating 
post-error changes. We examined two factors that affected the preponderance of each type of 
error, speed vs. accuracy emphasis instructions and overall response speed. Analyses reported 
in supplementary materials comparing the speed of correct and error responses supported a 
shift from evidence-quality errors when accuracy was emphasised to response-speed errors 
when speed was emphasised. We observed a corresponding shift from post-error slowing 
under accuracy emphasis to post-error speeding under speed emphasis. Because evidence-
quality errors are slower than response-speed errors they should become more common in the 
slower half of responses than in the faster half of responses. In line with this expectation and 
the hypothesised relationship with post-error chances, in both experiments errors sped up 
relative to correct responses as overall response speed decreased within both the speed and 
accuracy conditions.  
Post-error slowing has been widely reported and typically associated with easy 
decisions. It is usually explained by an adaptive reaction that control error rates by increasing 
response caution. Easy decisions are likely associated with a preponderance of response-
speed errors, so these findings are consistent with the association we propose, and the 
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explanation is consistent with increased response caution being an effective means of 
reducing response-speed errors. Reports of post-error speeding are less common, typically 
occurring in lower accuracy conditions, consistent with the association we propose. It has 
been reported in two different types of paradigms associated with two different accounts of 
why it occurs.  
The orienting account predicts post-error speeding when errors are more common 
than correct responses and post-error slowing when errors are less common. This occurs 
because rarer responses evoke an orienting response that slows the subsequent trial. 
Notebaert et al. (2009; see also núńez Castellar et al., 2010) tested this account in a multiple-
choice paradigm where correct responses were rarer and errors predominated, and found 
post-error speeding1. Although the orienting account might accommodate the post-error 
slowing we observed, it does not account for our post-error speeding findings because correct 
responses were usually twice as common as errors. Also, speeding only occurred in the 
higher accuracy condition, whereas the orienting account predicts it should be more common 
when accuracy is lower.  
Williams et al.’s (2016) found post-error speeding in a task requiring very difficult 
choices.  Their “post-error recklessness” account suggested that participants became 
impatient when they realized accuracy could not be controlled by being more cautious and 
reacted by instead responding less cautiously, and hence faster and less accurately, on the 
following trial. Consistent with a voluntary cause, they found speeding in a difficult choice 
was reduced when accurate responding was financially rewarded. Similar explanations have 
 
1Oddball tasks have been used to provide further support for an orientation component to post-error slowing, as 
when irrelevant auditory cues are provided, responses following novel cues are slower and less accurate than 
responses following non-novel cue (but not slower and less accurate than uncued responses, suggesting the 
benefit of a cue may be diminished if the cue is novel; Parmentier & Andres, 2010). Parmentier, Vasilev, and 
Andres (2019) also found an interaction effect for post-error slowing and auditory cue type (novel vs. non-
novel), further suggesting an orientation effect may contribute to post-error slowing for tasks with auditory cues. 
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been supported in gambling (Verbruggen, Chambers, Lawrence & McLaren, 2017), and 
game-like (Dyson, Sundvall, Forder, & Douglas, 2018) tasks where increased response 
caution is ineffective in improving accuracy. In the current experiments, participant errors in 
the accuracy condition were signalled by feedback that was likely aversive, particularly as it 
signalled that they had failed in the goal emphasised in task instructions. Hence, they may 
have experienced greater disappointment following errors under accuracy than speed 
emphasis, and so more reckless responding followed.  
These proposed emotional reactions might be seen as maladaptive, however when 
viewed from the standpoint of reward-rate optimization (Bogacz et al., 2006) they could also 
be viewed as adaptive, increasing the number of opportunities to make a correct response by 
increasing the amount of trials one could complete. In our paradigm only a fixed number of 
trials were available, so this was not the case. However, it is possible that the habit of taking 
reward rate into account for situations where that it is adaptive many have been 
inappropriately generalized to the experimental setting.  
In supplementary materials we also examined post-error changes in accuracy using 
the standard, robust and matched calculations. For Rae et al. (2014) no effects were 
significant, but for Osth et al., (2017) there was a clear decrease in accuracy following an 
error, which tended to be larger for the accuracy condition. Although greater post-error 
accuracy under speed than accuracy emphasis is consistent with the standard cognitive 
control account, at the very least our findings suggests it is incomplete. One possible 
explanation is that the negative affect experienced following an error reduces accuracy 
because it takes away attentional resources from processing on the subsequent trial (Ben-
Haim et al., 2016). To the degree that the disappointment caused by an error is greater under 
accuracy emphasis this could also explain the associated decrease in accuracy relative to the 
speed emphasis condition.  
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Alternatively, Rabbitt and Rodgers’ (1977) suggested a decrease in accuracy could 
index an error correction reflex that interferes with responding on the subsequent trial (also 
see Crump & Logan, 2012). Consistent with this explanation, incorrect post-error responses 
are often the correct response to the previous trial and when the stimulus from the error trial 
is repeated, responses are typically faster and more accurate (Rabbitt, 1969; Rabbitt & 
Rodgers, 1977). However, error corrections are particularly apparent when the inter-
response-interval is quite short (Jentzsch & Dudschig, 2009), which was certainly not the 
case for Osth et al.’s (2017) data because of the requirement for a post-choice confidence 
rating, and they are associated with post-error slowing, whereas we observed that a greater 
decrease in accuracy was associated with post-error speeding.    
Overall, our results suggest that although error-type has a key role in post-error 
adjustments, this factor interacts with a number of other processes. One is 
adaptive management of speed-accuracy tradeoffs, although unlike many current 
conceptions, we propose that this could be slowing or speeding, depending on error type and 
perhaps other contextual factors. Another component could be an error correction reflex that 
is important at short inter-response intervals. A third is an emotional component that causes 
post-error recklessness, which may be maladaptive in terms of reducing attentional resources 
required on the subsequent trial.  
One potential approach to the challenge of separating these effects is through 
applying the evidence-accumulation models that inspired our hypotheses about different error 
types. We did not pursue this approach here because of the challenges of fitting such models 
while taking account of the confounding factors addressed by the robust and matched 
methods of calculating post-error effects. Although these same methods could be used to 
extract a subset of data that could then be fit with such models, the reduced sample size and 
corresponding increase in measurement error is potentially problematic. Dutilh et al. (2013) 
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addressed this issue using a simplified evidence-accumulation model that can be estimated 
based on fewer trials because it removes between-trial variability in rate and starting-point 
parameters. Unfortunately, these are exactly the features necessary to explain the relative 
speed of error and correct responses and to accommodate response-speed and data-quality 
errors that we argue are a key factor in understanding post-error effects. In future work we 
plan to explore whether it is possible to gain further insight into the mechanisms underlying 
post-error slowing by using hierarchical Bayesian estimation (Heathcote et al., 2018) in an 
attempt to ameliorate the measurement noise issues when fitting evidence-accumulation 
models with the full suite of trial-to-trial variability parameters required to provide a 
comprehensive model of error phenomena.  
Finally, we believe our results have marked implications for the burgeoning literature 
using post-error effects in a range of applied research areas. We advise caution in interpreting 
different degrees of post-error slowing as indicative of differences in cognitive control, at 
least unless there is reason to believe that the groups or tasks being compared do not differ in 
the proportions of response-speed vs. data-quality errors. To the degree such differences are 
controlled, our results offer a new perspective when post-error speeding is observed, 
suggesting more reckless responses may arise as part of a more general control system that 
optimizes speed, accuracy and reward-rate trade-offs. 
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